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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by finding

the state had provided sufficient evidence to establish that the
defendant had obtained unauthorized

control over Ella Stevens'

property?
II.

Did the trial court commit prejudicial error by finding

the state had provided sufficient evidence to establish that the
defendant had intended to deprive Mrs. Stevens of her property?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Over the past few years defendant, Carol Fowler, has lived
next door to Ella Stevens (R. 87).

During this time defendant

and Mrs. Stevens became well acquainted and were good friends (R.
85,

133).

From the year

1984 to 1986 defendant visited Mrs.

Stevens almost daily, perceiving her to be a lonely widow in need
of company

(R. 100, 138).

Mrs. Stevens accepted and treated

defendant like a mother would treat her daughter (R. 133).
During the same period of time, defendant owned several pet
rabbits which she kept in her yard.

Because of her

financial

disabilities, defendant was finding it difficult to provide food
1

for the rabbits (R. 87).
undernourished

Mrs. Stevens noticed the rabbits were

and questioned

defendant

about

it.

Defendant

informed Mrs. Stevens that she was unable to afford food for the
rabbits.

Mrs. Stevens offered to pay for the rabbits1 food and

give defendant small amounts of cash weekly for this purpose (R.
104).
This prompted the defendant to ask Mrs. Stevens for money
for other purposes also.

She being shy about asking Mrs. Stevens

face to face for the money, would write letters explaining that
she needed cash to pay for traffic fines, automobile repairs,
animal care and other living expenses (R. 83, 88). Some of these
needs were legitimate and some were mere excuses for more money.
Mrs. Stevens kept a running total of all money borrowed by the
defendant, and both Mrs. Stevens and defendant viewed
advances

as a loan which defendant would

the cash

some day pay back.

Defendant has in fact made some payments on the loan

totaling

approximately $1,500 (R. 83).
Defendant has accumulated over the two years a debt of over
$70,000.00 (R. 141, 146).

Mrs. Stevens has never shown signs of

aggravation concerning defendant's debt; in fact, she has always
been willing to loan defendant even more money
suit came about by Mrs. Stevens 1

bank

(R. 8 5 ) .

notifying

This

Payson City

Police Department that Mrs. Stevens was regularly writing checks
in defendant's name, totalling significant amounts of money (R.
106, 109, 110).
Upon further investigation by Payson City Police, the State
2

brought suit against defendant for a violation of Section 76-6404 of the Utah Code Annotated.
1986, defendant

appeared

On the 27th day of March,

before the Honorable

Cullen Y.

Christensen (R. 80) in the Fourth Judicial District Court where
she was found guilty of the charge of theft.

Subsequently notice

of appeal was filed in the Utah County Clerk's Office on May
30th, 1986.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court committed prejudicial error by finding the
State had provided sufficient evidence to establish that the
defendant obtained unauthorized

control over Ella Stevens'

property, as required under Section 76-6-404 of the Utah Code
Annotated.

Mrs. Stevens, at all times, willingly endorsed checks

in the defendant's name.

The relationship between the defendant

and Mrs. Stevens was similar to that of a mother and daughter (R.
133), causing Mrs. Stevens to feel sorrow for defendant and her
financial troubles and prompting her to temporarily ease the pain
by loaning defendant money.
The trial curt further erred prejudicially when it found
that the State had provided sufficient evidence to show that the
defendant intended to deprive Mrs. Stevens of her property.

Both

the defendant and Mrs. Stevens viewed the money advancements as a
loan, which the defendant would pay back as soon as she was
financially able to do so (R. 90).

Defendant has made some

payments on the loan totaling approximately $1,500.00.

Although

this is a minimal amount, it does show defendant's intentions
3

concerning Mrs. Stevens' money advancements.

In fact, defendant

has recently found employment (R. 143) at a position where she
can feasibly pay back the entire $70,200.00 over the next several
years, and defendant fully intends to do just that (R. 141, 146).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE STATE HAD PROVIDED
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANT
OBTAINED UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL OVER ELLA STEVENS1 PROPERTY
It is the defendants position that the State has failed to
prove essential elements of the crime of theft as defined in
Section 76-6-404, of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended, which
states:
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises
unauthorized control over the property of another with
a purpose to deprive him thereof. (Emphasis added)
This implies that the crime of theft requires a felonious taking
of the property of another.

Considering the facts at hand, one

finds that Mrs. Stevens consented to loaning money to defendant
(R. 85).

Defendant did not coerce, threaten, or force Mrs.

Stevens in any way to loan her money, she merely asked Mrs.
Stevens for it and Mrs. Stevens parted with it willingly.

Its

true that defendant did at times lie about her needs for which
the money was to be used, but she did this only because she was
shy about asking for loans and felt that Mrs. Stevens would ask
less questions if defendant's needs were related to general
living expenses.
she

When defendant asked Mrs. Stevens for money,

gave it of her own free will regardless of defendant's need
4

for it.
Returning to the wording of Section 76-6-404, it becomes
obvious that if the taking of another's property is with that
person's consent, then

no crime of theft

is established

regardless of whether the "obtainer" has a purpose to deprive the
owner thereof.

Such was the finding of the Utah Supreme Court in

the case of State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3 (Utah, 1982).
defendant

in this case, was charged

with

The

auto theft and

possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
for value.

A jury convicted Franks of possession of a controlled

substance and second degree felony auto theft.
his conviction for theft.

Franks appealed

The facts indicated that defendant had

been apprehended by a highway patrolman for speeding in Sevier
County, Utah.

Defendant was driving a Cadillac with Tennessee

license plates and could not produce a driver's license or
certificate

of title.

After an investigation the officer

discovered that the car belonged to a Garland Smith, whom the car
was subsequently returned to.

At trial, the only evidence going

to the theft charge was the testimony of the arresting officer
essentially as to those facts as set forth above.

The defendant

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at trial as to the
conviction of theft, contending the State had not proved that he
exercised unauthorized control over the property.

To this the

Supreme Court said:
...We agree. Although the elements of an offense may
be established by direct or circumstantial evidence,
the evidence adduced in this case was de minimus and
therefore insufficient to support a conviction of
5

theft. We deem this to be so notwithstanding the
usual deference given the verdict of the jury. The
State contends that there is no evidence that the
owner consented to defendant's control of the vehicle.
That is true but the burden is on the State to show
unauthorized control, not on the defendant to show
authorized control. (Emphasis added). IdT at 4.
Returning to the case at hand, the State has failed to offer any
evidence that defendant's obtaining of Mrs. Stevens' money was
unauthorized.

In fact, the State's evidence has proven the

contrary, the State admits that Mrs. Stevens voluntarily advanced
money to the defendant.

Therefore, the State has fallen short of

its legally imposed burden of proof.

It has only proven that

defendant obtained Mrs. Stevens property.

The mere obtaining of

property by itself is not suggestive of a crime.

It is the

unauthorized control of one's property that makes the action
criminal.

Thus, defendant contends that the State has failed in

its proof that defendant exercised or obtained

unauthorized

control over the property of Ella Stevens.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE STATE HAD PROVIDED
'SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE DEFENDANT HAD THAT
THE INTENT TO DEPRIVE ELLA STEVENS OF HER PROPERTY.
Defendant
establish
"purpose

a
to

further

second

the

determining

whether

depriving

Ella

circumstances

element

deprive."

committing

contends
of

the

The S t a t e

offense
the

Stevens

of

over

a

surrounding that

State
of

charged

period
acted

property
two y e a r
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the

offense

has

defendant
her

that

the

of

that

of

years.

the

must

period.

to

defendant

two

with

one

theft,

failed

purpose

consider

with
In
of
all

As has been

previously

discussed

Ella regularly gave

different amounts of cash to defendant upon defendant's request.
Defendant stated several different times that she planned on
paying the money back.

In fact, defendant even set dates when

she would pay back a specific sum.

Although she did not always

succeed in paying the stated amount on the set day, she did
manage to pay back somewhere between $1,500.00 and $1,700.00.
Defendant's payments on the loan, although minimal, expressed an
intention of returning the money.

Likewise, Mrs. Stevens keeping

a running total of all money borrowed, conveyed her intention
that the sum would be returned.
Another interesting point is that Ella Stevens did not
initiate the suit.

In other words, Mrs. Stevens never became so

aggravated at defendant's pleas for money that she decided to
take legal action against her.

On the contrary, Mrs. Stevens was

fond of the defendant and trusted that she would pay back the
money as she was able.

This prosecution came about by Mrs.

Stevens' bank noticing the defendant drawing substantial amounts
of cash from Mrs. Stevens' account.
Again, the State has failed to supply any evidence that the
defendant intended to deprive Mrs. Stevens of her money, except
for the fact that defendant at times falsely expressed her needs
for the cash.

Defendant only expressed false needs to Mrs.

Stevens because she was embarrassed about asking for more money.
Defendant felt if she could make Mrs. Stevens feel the money was
being used for legitimate living expenses she would part with it
7

without asking a lot of questions.
Defendant

and

Mrs. Stevens

advancements as a loan.

both

perceived

the

cash

Defendant has at all times expressed an

intent to pay back the money, and has just recently received some
steady employment which will provide her the means to do

so.

Since defendant at her current employment will be able to pay
back, over the next several years, the entire $70,200.00, she
obviously has not intended to deprive Mrs. Stevens of her money,
and the State has failed to produce any other evidence proving
defendant had the required criminal mens rea.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, defendant seeks reversal of her conviction for
theft.

Defendant respectfully contends the trial court erred in

finding the State had provided sufficient evidence to prove
essential elements of the crime of theft as defined under Section
76-6-404 of the Utah Code Annotated;

namely,

exercising

unauthorized control over another's property and also the intent
to deprive that person thereof.
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DECEIVED MAR 2 8 m$
DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. CR-86-4
vs.
DECISION
CAROL FOWLER,
Defendant*

This matter came on duly and regularly for trial
before the Court sitting without a jury at the specific
request of the defendant.

The plaintiff appeared and was

represented by counsel Kent M. Barry, Esq.

The defendant

appeared and was represented by counsel Gary H. Weight, Esq.
The Court thereupon heard the evidence adduced by the parties
in support of their respective positions, reviewed the
memoranda of counsel and upon being advised in the premises,
now finds beyond a reasonable doubt as follows:
1. (a) That during the two years immediately
prior to December 1985, the defendant obtained from Ella
Stevens the approximate sum of $70,200.00.
(b) That such money was obtained in Utah
County, Utah.
(c) That defendant contends that such sum was
obtained from Ella Stevens as loans.
(d) That during said period of time the defen-

-2-

flag person for approximately two months early in 1984.
(e)

That Ella Stevens, a widow, is now 84 years

old and resides next door to the defendant.
(f)

That the defendant during such two year

period visited almost daily with Ella Stevens thereby ingratiating herself to Ella Stevens.
(g)

That defendant represented to Ella Stevens

that defendant was gainfully employed and had the means to
repay said money within a reasonable time; that such representations were false; that defendant repeatedly lied to Ella
Stevens about the need and purpose for which defendant sought
money from Ella Stevens; that defendant repeatedly falsified
records and receipts for the purpose of concealing from Ella
Stevens the real purposes for which said money was obtained
by the defendant from said victim; that defendant knew there
was no realistic possibility that defendant would be able to
repay said money to the victim and defendant's assertions to
the victim that such money would be repaid were nothing
more than a fraud and a sham to facilitate obtaining money
from the victim and to deprive the victim thereof; that
defendant was aware that her promises to repay said money
to the victim were reasonably certain not to be performed
and the defendant thus obtained such money from the victim
with the purpose to deprive the victim thereof.

(76-6-401

UCA; State v. Walker 658 P.2d 16)
2.

The Court therefore finds that the defendant
—J

- — « « A « O K 1 O Hnnht of the charge contained

-3-

in the Information.
3.

Defendant is ordered to appear before the

Court for the imposition of sentence on the 4th day of April
1986 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m.
Dated this -Jl~7 l^

day of March 1986.

BY THE COURT:

W&Z&n*£rt)
Cullen Yj/ Christensen, Judge

cc:

County Attorney
Gary H. Weight, Atty.

